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TAX INJUNCTIONS AND SUITS TO RECOVER
TAXES PAID UNDER PROTEST IN
NORTH CAROLINA
E. M. PERKINS*
The protesting taxpayer is fortunate if he chances to follow the
correct procedure for tax relief. Confusing remedies must ,be pur-
sued -before courts ever reluctant to interfere with the revenue. It
is the purpose of this article to describe the development of tax in-
junctions and the recovery of taxes paid under protest in North
Carolina, to attempt a statement of the.present status of this relief,
and to question the efficacy of the statutory provisions for adminis-
trative remedies.
I. TAx INJUNCTIONS
Three merchants of Fayetteville, who lived in the country and
came to town to conduct their businesses, wanted an injunction to
prevent the Fayetteville commissioners from collecting taxes on
property used in these activities in the town. The Court took juris-
diction and ruled against plaintiffs on the merits. This case in 1864
marks the beginning of tax injunctions in North Carolina.' Although
the merchants could have contested the taxes by paying them under
protest and bringing actions at law for money had and received, the
Court entertained the proceeding to prevent a multiplicity of suits.2
At that time this state did not have a tax injunction statute. Chief
Justice Pearson carefully explained that the decision was confined to
bills against municipal corporations and was not an authority for in-
* Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.1Worth v. Fayetteville, 60 N. C. 617 (1864). An act of the General As-
sembly of 1864 empowered the commissioners of Fayetteville to impose taxes
upon non-residents whose avocations were pursued within the town, in the
same manner as upon residents. The Court consideied that the merchants had
a business residence in the town and could be required to contribute to the
municipal expenses. Five years before, Manly v. Raleigh, 57 N. C. 370 (1859),
an injunction had been sought against a municipal corporation to enjoin the
levying of town taxes. The injunction was denied and the question of juris-
diction was not raised. However, that case 'was seized as a precedent for the
'bill in Worth v. Fayetteville.
... according to the mode of proceeding at law, every taxpayer must
bring a separate action, and it is necessary that jurisdiction should be assumed
in equity to prevent the multiplicity of suits," Worth v. Fayetteville, supra note
1, at 619. See 3 CooLzY, TAXATmIO (4th ed. 1924) §1641; Cf. 4 POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §1781, which seems to consider only the
North Carolina cases after the 1889 statute.
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junctions against state or county taxes. The latter involved a much
more serious question. It was considered that the possibility of shut-
ting off state or county revenues entirely dwarfed the problem of
multiple actions. 3
This opinion prompted the General Assembly of 1865 to authorize
"That the writ of injunction shall be allowed under the usual rules in
all cases, against the collection of so much of said taxes, as may
appear to have been illegally imposed or assessed."4 During the next
twenty years equity was the customary scene of tax litigation,
although judicial doubts of the wisdom of the procedure lingered on.5
3 Furthermore, "a court of equity has no machinery and no offices by which
it can enforce its orders against an officer of the government. For illustration:
Suppose a bill to be entertained against a Sheriff . . .; he disobeys the order.
What officer has the Court by whom the Sheriff can be taken into custody and
brought before it for alleged contempt? ... I will pursue the subject no
further." Pearson, Ch. J., in Worth v. Fayetteville. supra note 1, at 621. It was
pointed out, to allay fears for the safety of local revenue, that if town func-
tions were likely to be impeded the town could insist on an injunction bond
and it 'was apprehended that few complainants who filed bills in behalf of
themselves and all others -would be willing to bind themselves to answer the
whole default.
'N. C. Pun. LAws 1864-65, c. 32 ("Whereas, doubts have been expressed
whether a writ of injunction is an allowed remedy against the wrongful collec-
tion of public taxes); see Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244 (1870) ; Mace v.
Carteret, 99 N. C. 65, 5 S. E. 740 (1888).
'The Court made a distinction between illegal taxes and erroneous taxes,
injunctions being limited to the former. See Brodnax v. Groom, supra, note
4, at 247. Ch. J. Pearson, commenting on the Act of 1865 said: "... we think
the act includes only cases which involve the constitutional power to impose the
tax or to authorize it to be done, and that the remedy by injunction against the
collection of state or county taxes does not embrace questions as to the mode
of valuing property, the sufficiency of the sheriff's bond, and the like, which
may be called matters of detail.'
In the following cases decided- between 1865-1887 equitable relief was
granted upon the indicated grounds: Excess of constitutional limits: Simmons
v. Wilson, 66 N. C. 337 (1872) ; Mitchell v. Bd. Trustees, 71 N. C. 400 (1874) ;
Trull v. Madison, 72 N. C. 388 (1885). Levied for an illegal or unauthorized
purpose: Mitchell v. Bd. Trustees, supra; Long v. Richmond, 76 N. C. 273
(1877) ; Bradshaw v. Guilford, 92 N. C. 278 (1885) ; Riggsbee v. Durham, 94
N. C. 800 (1886) ; Duke v. Brown, 96 N. C. 127, 1 S. E. 873 (1887). Question
of jurisdiction to tax: Buie v. Fayetteville, 79 N. C. 267 (1878). Subjects
exempt from taxation: Richmond and Danville R. v. Brogden, 74 N. C. 707
(1876); Petersburg R. Co. v. Northampton, 81 N. C. 487 (1879); Atlantic,
Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. Anson, 88 N. C. 519 (1883). Violation. of uniform-
ity: Young v. Henderson, 76 N. C. 420 (1872); Puitt v. Gaston, 94 N. C. 709
(1885) ; Duke v. Brown, supra. Assessed by unauthorized officials: Carolina
Central R. v. Wilmington, 72 N. C. 73 (1873); Richmond and Danville R. v.
Brogden, supra; Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1 (1876). Taxes not as-
sessed in proper year: Sudderth v. Brittain, 76 N. C. 458 (1877) ; Johnson v.
Royster, 88 N. C. 194 (1883). Discriminatory tax: Albertson v. Wallace, 81
N. C. 479 (1879). Statutory deductions not allowed: McAden v. Mecklenburg-,
97 N. C. 355, 2 S. E. 670 (1887).
The Court supplemented the brief statute with an amount of equity juris-
prudence. See Haughton v. Jones, 70 N. C. 466, 468 (1874), Reade, J., after
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A legislative limitation was imposed in 1887. Injunctions were re-
stricted to taxes "levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized
purpose."6 Two years later the statute was broadened to permit in-
junctions when the tax was illegal or invalid or was levied for an
illegal or unauthorized purpose.t Substantially that provision has
remained in the laws from 1889 until today s now being found in two
sections of Michie's North Carolina Code of '1931, Section 858 and
Section 7979.
The Revenue Act of 1927 forbade the courts to enjoin the col-
lection of any tax imposed in that Act9 and the laws of later years
holding plaintiff's protest bad on the merits, "We have not overlooked the fact
that the complaint does not allege the probability of irreparable injury or the
insolvency of the defendants.... Nor the facts alleged in the answer that
every other taxpayer in the county has paid his taxes except the plaintiff."
See also Street v. Craven, 70 N. C. 644 (1874); Mitchell v. Craven, 74 N. C.
487, 490 (1876); London v. Wilmington, 78 N. C. 109 (1878); Simpson v.
Mecklenburg, 84 N. C. 158 (1881).
'N. C. Pun. LAws 1887, c. 137, §84 ("No injunction shall be granted by
any court or judge in this state to restrain the collection of any tax or any part
thereof, hereafter levied, nor to restrain the sale of any property for the non-
payment of any such tax, except such tax or the part thereof enjoined be levied
or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose," etc.) The statute then
provided for payment and recovery of taxes. In Raleigh and Gaston R. Co. v.
Lewis, 99 N. C. 62, 63, 5 S. E. 82 (1888), the first case to arise after the
passage of this statute, Ch. J. Smith remarked that the purpose of the statute
was to free the process of collection from embarrassments "so injurious to
government, both state, county and municipal." He stated that as there were
ample means of remedying the collection of illegal taxes the statute did not
violate the State or Federal Constitutions. In this period from 1887 to 1889
there were only a few tax injunction cases. The contention in this case was
that complainant's property was exempt. The injunction was denied since this
was not a tax for an "illegal or unauthorized purpose." Mace v. Carteret,
mspra note 4, brought up an allegation that the tax was levied for an illegal or
unauthorized purpose. But this was insufficient. The constituent facts which
would show such a purpose should have been stated. The injunction was de-
nied. Matthews v. Sampson, 99 N. C. 69, 5 S. E. 742 (1888), reached a similar
fate.
'N. C. Pun. LAws 1889, c. 218, §82. ("No injunction shall be granted ...
except such tax or the part thereof enjoined be levied or assessed for an illegal
or unauthorized purpose, or be illegal or invalid, or the assessment be illegal
or invalid .... )
8 N. C. Pun. LAws 1891, c. 323, §78; 1893, c. 297, §76; 1895, c. 119, §76;
1897, c. 169, §79; 1899, c. 15, §78; 1901, c. 558, §30; The Revisal of 1905 con-
tained two sections relative to tax injunctions, both of which were derived
from the provision in the Pun. LAws of 1901. §821 corresponds with §858 of
MIcHIE's NORTH CAROLINA CODE Of 1931; and §2855 corresponds with §7979 of
MIcHIE. They appeared in Pell's Revisal of 1908 as §821 and §2855.
9 N. C. Pun. LAws 1927, c. 80, §464; N. C. CODE ANN (Michie, 1927) §7880
(189) ; ("No court of this state shall entertain a suit of any kind brought for
the purpose of preventing the collection of any tax imposed in this act. .. .")
The statute then sets out the procedure for payment under protest and suit to
recover. The recovery procedure is quoted later in this article.
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'have contained the same prohibition.10 Inheritance, estate, state
license, franchise, income, and sales taxes are imposed by the Revenue
Act.11 On the other hand, property taxes are levied by the 'boards of
county commissioners pursuant to the direction of the Machinery
Act,12 and by the municipal governing boards under the authority of
the municipal charters and under a general authorization from the
General Assembly.13  The same is true of the poll tax.14  At the
present time, the state government does not have a property tax.
County and city license taxes are authorized by the Revenue Act and
imposed by the county or city governing boards.' 5  From this it
should follow that since property taxes, poll taxes and county and
city license taxes are not imposed by the Revenue Act, the prohibition
of injunctions does not apply to these taxes. But there are com-
plications in the way. After forbidding injunctions, the section in
the Revenue Act sets out the procedure for payment under protest
and recovery of taxes, whether they are state, county or city. This
may imply that the part of the section pertaining to injunctions ap-
plies also to county and city taxes. Indeed, in 1931 when some Pitt
County taxpayers asked for an injunction against property taxes,
Chief Justice Stacy said in denying relief, "Furthermore, it is pro-
vided by Chapter 427, Public Laws of 1931, Section 510, that the
collection of any tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1931 shall not be
prevented by injunction." 16 The Revenue Act of 1931 did direct the
"N. C. Pmr. LAws 1929, c. 345, §464; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1929) §7880 (382). N. C. PuB. LAws 1931, c. 427 §510; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §7880 (194). N. C. PuB. LAws 1933, c. 445, §510; N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933) §7880 (194).
'N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 445, §492; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §7880 (176). ("The taxes levied in this act are for the expenses of the
State Government, . .!)
"N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §527; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §7971 (56).
"N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1931) §2677.
N . C. PuB. LAws 1933, c. 204, §522; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §7971 (51). Also N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2677.
"N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 445, art. II; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) c. 131, art. 2; see N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2677.
" Hooker v. Pitt, 202 N. C. 4, 161 S. E. 542 (1931). Plaintiffs asserted
their properties were assessed in excess of the constitutional requirement of
"true value in money," and that the rate levied for general county purposes
exceeded the constitutional limit. The Court replied that as plaintiffs that year
had profited from a reduction in the valuation of their properties and as the
lower Court had found the tax rate constitutional the causes of action were
without any basis for equitable relief. As for excessive valuation, it was
pointed out that plaintiffs had not fully taken advantage of their remedy at law
for correcting the assessment. The Court then observed that the Revenue Act
of 1931 forbade injunctions. Cf. Moore v. Sugg, 112 N. C. 233, 17 S. E. 72
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boards of county commissioners to levy a property tax for state
purposes, 17 and if this were a part of the litigated tax, that would
explain the Chief Justice's statement.
All the same, several prior decisions of 1930 and 1931 strengthen
the view that injunctions against county and municipal taxes still may
be had. In one case the Court sanctioned an injunction against the
collection of a tax on property outside the jurisdiction of a municipal-
ity.'8 A second case approved an injunction against the collection
of county poll taxes in excess of the constitutional limit,' 9 and a third
enjoined the collection of county taxes on exempt property.20 In
none of these cases did the Court appear concerned over its jurisdic-
tion to grant equitable relief. 2 ' Here were property taxes and poll
taxes involved, levied -by counties or towns, and levied since the dis-
turbing provision barring injunctions appeared in the Revenue Acts.
It seems possible then to say that the ban on injunctions is limited to
taxes of the state government, since they are the ones imposed in the
Revenue Act and that taxpayers still may call on equity to relieve
them from county or municipal taxes.
If the above is a justifiable conclusion, under what circumstances
will a court exercise its jurisdiction? We look to Section 858 and
Section 7979 and to the decisions. There is slight difference between
these sections so far as they concern injunctions. Section 858, which
is the shorter, might be called a negative authorization, and is to this
effect:
"No injunction may be granted by any court or judge to restrain
the collection of any tax or any part thereof, or to restrain the sale
of any property for the non-payment of any tax, unless such tax or
the part thereof enjoined is levied or assessed for an illegal or un-
authorized purpose or the tax is illegal or invalid."
22
(1893), where the 1891 injunction statute was interpreted as applying only to
taxes levied in that particular statute.
IN. C. PuB. LAws 1931, c. 427, §492; N. C. COD ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§7880 (176). •
"Reynolds v. Asheville, 199 N. C. 212, 154 S. E. 85 (1930) ; see Barber v.
Benson, 200 N. C. 683, 158 S. E. 245 (1931) where special claims for interven-
tion by equity influenced the decision.
" Dixon v. Pitt, 200 N. C. 215, 156 S. E. 852 (1931).
' Town of Andrews v. Clay, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931); see,
Salisbury Hospital v. Rowan, 205 N. C. 8, 169 S. E. 805 (1933) where the judg-
ment was, "that defendant be not enjoined . . . from collecting the taxes."
'In Reynolds v. Asheville, supra note 18, at 213, it was said, "the ap-
propriateness of the proceeding, to test by injunction the validity of the
alleged illegal tax, is asserted in R. R. v. Commissioners, 188 N. C. 265, 124
S. E. 560."
' §7979 provides, "Unless a tax or assessment, or some part thereof, be
illegal or invalid or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, no injunc-
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The distinctions drawn in the cases are not between illegal and in-
valid, nor between illegal and unauthorized, but rather between illegal
and erroneous. 23 It is considered that an illegal tax reflects a more
complete departure from law than does an erroneous tax. If the tax-
levying body is without authority to make the levy, an illegal tax
results. For example, where the subject is outside the jurisdiction, 24
or is exempt from taxation,2 5 or the rate of the tax is unconstitu-
tional ;2R or where the tax is for a purpose unauthorized by statute27
or popular vote,28 or is for an unconstitutional purpose,29 or when
tion shall be granted by any court or judge to restrain the collection thereof in
whole or in part nor to restrain the sale of any property for the non-payment
thereof; nor shall any court issue any order in claim and delivery proceedings
for the taking of any personalty levied on by the sheriff to enforce payment
of such tax or assessment against the owner thereof... !' The section then
provides the procedure for recovery of taxes. Note that the difference between
§858 and §7979 is that §858 does not have the claim and delivery clause.
'In taxation it would seem that either term, "illegal" or "invalid," could
be applied to the same taxes. "Erroneous" usually refers to an assessment
authorized by law but the result of defective judgment, or arrived at not
strictly in accordance -with the prescribed method. See Southern R. Co. v.
Cherokee, 195 N. C. 756, 143 S. E. 467 (1928) (taxes are referred to as
"illegal or invalid"); McDonald v. Teague, 119 N. C. 604, 26 S. E. 158 (1896);
Armstrong v. Stedman, 130 N. C. 217, 41 S. E. 278 (1902); Wilson v. Green,
135 N. C. 343, 47 S. E. 469 (1904) ; Hyatt v. DeHart, 140 N. C. 270, 52 S. E.
781 (1905) ; Howell v. Haywood, 151 N. C. 575, 66 S. E. 571 (1909) ; Galloway
v. Brunswick, 184 N. C. 245, 114 S. E. 165 (1922); Vester v. Nashville, 190
N. C. 265, 129 S. E. 593 (1925) ;1 Western Carolina Power Co. v. Burke, 201
N. C. 318, 160 S. E. 173 (1931).
' Sherrod v. Dawson, 154 N. C. 525, 70 S. E. 739 (1911); Reynolds v.
Asheville, spra note 18; see Ransom v. Weldon, 194 N. C. 237, 139 S. E.
232 (1927); Hall v. Fayetteville, 115 N. C. 281, 20 S. E. 373 (1894) criticized
in Armstrong v. Stedman, supra note 23, at 221.
'United Brethren v. Forsyth, 115 N. C. 489, 20 S. E. 626 (1894); Purnell
v. Page, 133 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 534-(1903) ; Caldwell a.nd Co. v. Smith, 151
N. C. 70, 65 S. E. 641 (1909) ; Long v. Watts, 183 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765
(1922) ; Town of Andrews v. Clay, suspra note 20; see Wilmington and Weldon
R. Co. v. Alsbrook, 110 N. C. 137, 14 S. E. 652 (1892) ; Pocomoke Guano Co.
v. Biddle, 158 N. C. 212, 73 S. E. 996 (1912); Southern Assembly v. Palmer,
166 N. C. 75, 82 S. E. 18 (1914).
' Williams v. Craven, 119 N. C. 520, 26 S. E. (1896) ; Rodman v. Wash-
ington, 122 N. C. 39, 30 S. E. 118 (1898) ; Norfolk-Southern R. Co. v. Reid,
187 N. C. 320, 121 S. E. 534 (1924) ; Dixon v. Pitt, supra note 19; see Wingate
v. Parker, 136 N. C. 369, 48 S. E. 774 (1904) ; Perry v. Franklin, 148 N. C.
521, 62 S. E. 608 (1908).
' Hawes v. Pender, 175 N. C. 268, 95 S. E. 482 (1918) ; Cooper v. Franklin,
183 N. C. 231, 111 S. E. 521 (.922) ; Southern R. Co. v. Cherokee, supra note
23; see Wilmington Ins. Co. v. Stedman, 130 N. C. 221, 41 S. E. 279 (1902).
. Snider v. Jackson, 175 N. C. 590, 96 S. E. 32 (1918) ;, Williams v. Polk,
176 N. C. 554, 97 S. E. 478 (1918) ; Groves v. Rutherford, 180 N. C. 568, 105
S. E. 172 (1920) ; Weesner v. Davidson, 182 N. C. 604, 109 S. E. 863 (1921) ;
Galloway v. Brunswick, supra note 23; Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N. C. 392, 119
S. E. 767 (1923); see Young v. Hendersonville, 129 N. C. 422, 40 S. E. 89
(1901) ; Hyatt v. DeHart, supra. note 23; Casey v. Dare, 168 N. C. 285, 84
S. E. 268 (1915); Jones v. Robeson, 187 N. C. 557, 122 S. E. 290 (1924);
Bivens v. Stanly, 187 N. C. 769, 122 S. E. 846 (1924).
' Hutton v. Webb, 124 N. C. 749, 33 S. E. 169 (1899).
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the statute authorizing the tax was not passed in conformity with the
constitution,30 then the tax is bad. It is then called illegal, invalid or
void, and injunction lies.3 1
Conceding power to tax the subject and that the rate is legal, the
taxpayer may contend that his property has been incorrectly valued.
The term erroneous is applied to this tax, and the injunction statutes
do not authorize relief here. The distinction is more practical than
logical. If a man has property worth a thousand dollars and it is
assessed at two thousand dollars, the tax on the excess should be just
as illegal as a tax on exempt property. He may have an injunction
against the tax on exempt property, and against other taxes termed
illegal, but when the valuation is erroneous he must first take advan-
tage of administrative remedies. If unsuccessful there, the statutes
give him an appeal to the courts in some cases; in others, a clarifica-
tion of the disputed point should be sought by a writ of certiorari.
8 2
His remedy is neither by injunction nor by payment and suit to
recover. Valuations can be determined as well, if not better, by an
administrative body as by a court, and when the administrative body
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the party, and there
is no intentional discrimination, equity offers no relief from the result.
It is fundamental, however, that the taxpayer must be given an op-
portunity to be heard before the assessment becomes final. The lack
of this brands the tax as so irregular that the irregularity shades into
illegality and the tax may be enjoined.
33
"Rodman v. Washington, supra note 26; Hooker v. Greenville, 130 N. C.
472, 42 S. E. 141 (1920) ; Armstrong v. Stedman, supra note 23; Graves v.
Commissioners, 135 N. C. 49, 47 S. E. 134 (1904) ; Allen v. Raleigh, 181 N. C.
453, 107 S. E. 463 (1921); see Rodman-Heath Cotton Mills v. Waxhaw, 130
N. C. 293, 41 S. E. 488 (1902).
'Among other taxes denominated illegal and which may be enjoined are
those: where the statute authorizing the tax violates the constitutional limita-
tion on local, private or special acts, Sechrist v. Guilford, 181 N. C. 511, 107
S. E. 503 (1921) ; where the assessing officials are without power to make the
assessment, Atlantic and North Carolina R. Co. v. New Bern, 147 N. C. 165, 60
S. E. 925 (1908); where the requirement of uniformity is violated, Puitt v.
Gaston, supra note 5; where the tax violates some provision of the Federal
Constitution, Albertson v. Wallace, 81 N. C. 479 (1879). .
' See II (A) of this article for a discussion of administrative remedies in
connection with suits to recover. See Covington v. Rockingham, 93 N. C. 134
(1885); Wilson v. Green, mpra note 23; Hart v. Burke, 192 N. C. 161, 134
S. E. 403 (1926) ; Hooker v. Pitt, supra note 16.
'Caldwell Land Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C. 199, 59 S. E. 653 (1907); see
Norfolk-Southern R. Co. v. Carteret, 188 N. C. 265, 124 S. E. 560 (1924) (if
plaintiff contends the assessment is illegal because of absence of notice, he
must also contend the property is not in fact worth the assessed value);
Hart v. Burke, supra note 32; Markham v. Carver, 188 N. C. 615, 125 S. E.
409 (1924); Marion v. Pilot Mountain, 170 N. C. 118, 87 S. E. 53 (1915).
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Ragan v. Doughton,84 bearing on what is illegal, requires special
statement. The Commissioner of Revenue had ruled that the plaintiff
was engaged in the business of buying and selling real estate for
profit and consequently was subject to a state license tax. Plaintiff,
who alleged he was not so engaged, tried to enjoin collection of the
tax. The Court said that this was not an attack upon the legality of
the tax but only a challenge of the administrative official's determina-
tion of fact. Therefore, injunction was not appropriate, but the tax-
payer should pay and sue to recover. This case has been interpreted
as disallowing injunctions when only the administration of the law
and not the taxing act itself is questioned, 3 5-a troublesome distinc-
tion and an important one, but not consistently followed. For ex-
ample, it is administrative action which includes exempt property in
a tax list, yet there injunctions are allowed.8 6
Illegality of the tax has generally been all that the North Carolina
Court has asked before it would exercise jurisdiction.3 7 Some other
jurisdictions have required an historical ground for equitable inter-
vention.88 Now and then in the North Carolina cases there are in-
dications of a similar leaning, but these instances are rare.3 9 It seems
safe to say that the plaintiff should point out wherein the tax is
"illegal" or "invalid" or that it is assessed for an "illegal or un-
authorized purpose" and the court will take jurisdiction. Of course,
the plaintiff must take care that he is a fit person to ask aid of equity.
- 192 N. C. 500, 135 S. E. 28 (1926). Cf. Barber v. Benson, supra note 18
where in a similar case the Court found facts "sufficient to invoke the aid of a
court of equity."
Soper, D. J., in Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 32 F (2d) 570,
574 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
"Supra note 25.
" Moore v. Sugg, supra note 16; Armstrong v. Stedman, supra note 23;
Purnell v. Page, suprat note 25 (" . . . as to the other point, whether the
plaintiff can maintain an injunction against the sale of his property under an
illegal tax or must pay the tax under protest and sue to recover it back, it is
equally well settled that he can pursue either remedy") ; Graves v. Commis-
sioners, supra note 30; Sherrod v. Dawson, supra note 24; Norfolk-Southern
R. Co. v. Carteret, supra note 33; see Director-General v. Bladen, 178 N. C.
449, 101 S. E. 91 (1919), dissent of Clark, C. J.
'3 CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §1641.
'See Haughton v. Jones, supra note 5, at 468; Hilliard v. Asheville, 118
N. C. 845, 852, 24 S. E. 738, 739 (1896) (pointing out that no irreparable
damage was threatened).
A distinction is made between municipal taxing acts and municipal or-
dinances either wholly or partly regulatory. Although the latter involve pay-
ments -which are similar to taxes, their enforcement will not be restrained
unless irreparable injury is threatened to property rights or the rights of
persons. Thompson v. Lumberton, 182 N. C. 260, 108 S. E. 722 (1921); Dixie
Poster Advertising Co. v. Asheville, 189 N. C. 737, 128 S. E. 149 (1925);
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Sanford, 200 N. C. 467, 157 S. E. 432 (1931).
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It may be desired to enjoin the levying of a tax, or the collection
of the tax, or more specifically the sale of the plaintiff's property.
The action may be brought by the taxpayer in his own behalf only,
or 'he may sue on behalf of all other taxpayers similarly situated.40
The defendants in the proceeding will be those whose activities the
taxpayer wishes to stop. The county commissioners or the town
governing body would normally be the defendants where the levying
of the tax is to be prevented ;41 the county or city tax collector where
the collection is to be stopped ;42 and the-person selling the plaifitiff's
property where a sale is threatened. 48  Sometimes the defendants are
both the board of commissioners and the tax collector where the
action is to prevent the levying and collection of the tax.
44
It is very important that plaintiff's allegations be full. He should
allege. that the tax is illegal and then set forth the constituent facts
necessary to show the illegality; an allegation simply of illegality
would be insufficient.45 The plaintiff taxpayer, who is hardly ever
a favorite with the court, should be particular to give himself a
standing in equity. He should be careful to allege that he or his
property is subject to the questioned levy.46 His cause could hardly
' London v. Wilmington, .rpra note 5; Moore v. Sugg, supra note 16;
Allen v. Raleigh, supra note 30; Long v. Watts, 183 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765
(1922).
'Graves v. Commissioners, upra note 30; Wharton v. Greensboro, 146
N. C. 356, 59 S. E. 1043 (1907) ; Snider v. Jackson; Groves v. Rutherford, both
supra note 28; Sechrist v. Guilford, supra note 31; Robinson v. Brunswick, 182
N. C. 590, 109 S. t. 855 (1921) ; Dixon v. Pitt, supra note 19.
'Wrought Iron Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C. 328, 24 S. E. 352 (1896); Arm-
strong v. Stedman, supra note 23; Atlantic and N. C. R. Co. v. City of New
Bern, 147 N. C. 165, 60 S. E. 925 (1908) ; Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C.
280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931); Long v. Watts, supra note 40 (enjoining the
Revenue Commissioner, prior to the 1927 change in injunctions) ; see Ransom
v. Weldon, supra note 24 (where the injunction was sought against placing of
the property on the tax books and against collecting the taxes) ; North Carolina
R. Co. v. Alamance, 82 N. C. 260 (1880) (where collection restrained but
not other &iroceedings until merits of controversy determined).
, Purnell v. Page, supra note 25; Caldwell Land Co. v. Smith, supra note
33; Caldwell Land Co. v. Smith, supra note 25; Sherrod v. Dawson, supra note
24; Bethlehem Motors v. Flynt, 178 N. C. 399, 102 S. E. 610 (1919) ; Litchfield
v. Reid, 195 N. C. 161, 141 S. E. 543 (1928) ; see Barber v. Town of Benson,
supra note 18.
"Williams v. Craven, supra note 26; Wilson v. Green, supra note 23; see
Hooker v. Greenville, supra note 30.
' Mace v. Carteret, supra note 4; see, McDonald v. Teague, supra note 23;
Armstrong v. Stedman, supra note 23, at 220 (as to full denial by the answer
of matters stated in the complaint: "It could not be expected that any Judge
would restrain the collection of taxes in a case where the allegations of the
complaint had been met by a full and complete denial on the part of the
defendant.")
'Wood v. Braswell, 192 N. C. 588, 135 S. E. 529 (1926) ; see North Caro-
lina Automotive Ass'n. v. Doughton, 192 N. C. 384, 135 S. E. 131 (1926).
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be hurt by pointing out any special injuries he will suffer.47 It
should be stated what taxes, if any, he has paid or tendered.4 8 Be-
fore he asks for equitable relief he must pay whatever part of the
tax is concededly due. If he seeks to restrain a tax in excess of the
constitutional limit he must pay the admittedly constitutional portion.
It may be that the particular tax complained of may not be en-
joined, either because it is one imposed in the Revenue Act, or
because it is not an illegal tax. Perhaps, even though the tax is
illegal the taxpayer prefers not to contest it by injunction.49 In
many of these instances the remedy is to pay the tax under protest
and sue to recover it.
II. SUITS TO REcovER TAXES PAID UNDER PROTEST
In North Carolina the earliest forerunner of a method of recov-
ering taxes already paid was the action of trespass. Taxes were not
sought to be recovered, but damages were asked against the collecting
officer. Between 1809 and 1834 four cases were decided in which
the sheriff was sued in trespass for seizure of goods. In all four the
plaintiff lost on the merits, and the court did not discuss procedure. 50
In 1845 assumpsit for money had and received was used when the
tax had been paid after the sheriff threatened to levy on the prop-
erty. This time the taxpayer won on the merits. As to procedure, it
was said, "The plaintiffs paid the money under compulsion, with a
protest as to the defendant's right. There can be no doubt of their
Supra notes 5 and 39.
"Covington v. Rockingham, supra note 32; McAden v. Mecklenburg, supra
note 5; Armstrong v. Stedman, supra note 23; Purnell v. Page, supra note 25;
Wilson v. Green, supra note 23.
" "In this jurisdiction, a taxpayer may contest the validity of an assessment
or collection of tax upon his property in one of two ways: (1) He may pay
the alleged illegal or invalid tax under protest and then bring an action to
recover it back, observing, of course, the requirements of the statute with
respect to time, notice, etc.. . (2) He may, if the tax or assessment, or some
part thereof, be illegal or invalid, or be levied or assessed for an illegal or
unauthorized purpose, apply for injunctive relief without paying the alleged
illegal or invalid tax in advance ... " per, Stacy, J., in Norfolk-Southern R.
Co. v. Carteret, supra note 33, at 266.
' Sears v. West, 5 N. C. 291 (1809) ; Stewart v. Davis, 7 N. C. 244 (1819);
Cowles v. Brittain, 9 N. C. 204 (1922) ; Wynne v. Wright, 18 N. C. 19 (1834);
however, in Hairston v. Stinson, 35 N. C. 479 (1852), recovery of the value
of a horse sold by the sheriff was allowed. It does not appear what was the
form of action. See Tores v. Justices of Rowan, 6 N. C. 167 (1812), where the
liability of the sheriff is intimated. In Lockhart v. Harrington, 8 N. C. 408
(1821), the action was on a bond given by the sheriff upon seizing property for
payment of taxes.
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perfect right to recover it back." 51  In 1867 Chief Justice Pearson
influenced the development of recovery as he had recently influencect
tax injunctions. Although trespass had been used at that very ternm
of court, it was now disapproved.52 And too, he drew distinctions
in the use of assumpsit. If the sheriff proceeded to collect under a
tax list, which was considered a judgment for the amount of the list,
he was protected against action by the taxpayer. The taxpayer's
remedy was to apply to the county court to correct the valuation on
the tax list, but if he failed in that, the sheriff had to collect the
amount on the list. A similar distinction still exists in tax recovery,
where the amount to be recovered is that in excess of the tax on the-
valuation as finally established. When the sheriff collected without
the authority of a tax list, he would be liable not as a trespasser but
in the milder action of assumpsit.58 During the next twenty years
very few tax recovery cases reached the Supreme Court. It was a.
period of free use of the tax injunction.
In connection with the tax injunction statute of 1887 the legisla-
ture prescribed the method of recovery.5 4  The history of the pro--
cedural provision is very similar to that for injunctions. It appeared
in the Revenue Acts until 1905 when it became a part of the Revisal
of that year and is now a part of Section 7979 of Michie's Code of
1931. 55 Essentially the same as its predecessors, Section 7979,
provides:
"Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 27 N. C. 516 (1845) ; Bank of Cape Fear
v. Deming, 29 N. C. 55 (1846).'In Davis v. Dashiel, 61 N. C. 114 (1867) the action was trespass.
Plaintiff lost on the merits. Judge Pearson wrote the decision in Huggins v.
Hinson, 61 N. C. 126, 129 (1867), and said of Davis v. Dashiel that as the
sheriff won on the merits "it did not become necessary to notice the form of*
action."
' Huggins v. Hinson, supra note 52; and note this requirement at 129, "But
in order to entitle himself to this remedy [assumpsit] the party must pay the
money under protest, so that the sheriff may know before he pays the money
over that the matter is disputed, and have an opportunity to consult counsel and
pay the money back if satisfied of his error, or if doubtful may retain it as a
stakeholder subject to the result of the action." See Gore v. Mastin, 66 N. C.
371 (1872) following Huggins v. Hinson on the tax list point.
" N. C. PuB. LAws 1887, c. 137, §84, "but in every case the person or per-
sons claiming any tax or any part thereof to be for any reason invalid, or that
the valuation of his property is excessive or unequal, -who shall pay the same
to the tax collector or other proper officer in all respects as though the same
was legal and valid, such person may.. ...." etc., providing for demand and'
suit as in §7979 of Michie's 1931 Code. Note that the 1887 statute did not by
its terms require protest.
'Supra notes 7 and 8 for references to the session law history of this
procedure. In the revisal of 1905 it was §2855, and also §2855 of Pell's Revisal,
of 1908.
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"Whenever any person shall claim to have a valid defense to the
enforcement of a tax or assessment charged or assessed upon his
property or poll such person shall pay such tax or assessment to
the sheriff; but if, at the time of such payment, he shall notify the
sheriff in writing that he pays the same under protest, such pay-
ment shall be without prejudice to any defenses or rights he may
have in the premises, and he may, at any time within thirty days
after such payment demand the same in writing from the treasurer
of the state or of the county, city, or town for the benefit or under
the authority or by request of which the same was levied; and if
the same shall not be refunded within ninety days thereafter, may
sue such county, city or town for the amount so demanded, in-
cluding in his action against the county both state and county tax;
and if upon the trial it shall be determined that such tax or any
part thereof was levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthor-
ized purpose, or was for any reason invalid or excessive, judgment
shall be rendered therefor, with interest, and the same shall be
collected as in other cases. The amount of state taxes for which
judgment shall be rendered in such action shall be refunded by
the state treasurer."
It will be noted that this statute mentions only taxes "charged or
assessed upon . ..property or poll." The 1887 statute said "any
tax," and whatever may have been the legislative intention at the
time of the revisal, the use of the statute has not been restricted to
property and poll taxes.56 Also the statute provides for payment of
the tax to the sheriff, with notice that it is paid under protest. Since
the sheriff may not be the collecting officer, the statute is taken to
mean57 payment and notice to the proper collecting officer, whoever he
may be. Finally, note that recovery of state taxes is by suit against
the county. This was more appropriate for the period of the state
property tax, when the county collecting officer also collected for
the state.58
Any difficulties which these provisions of Section 7979 involve
may now be simply historical. For a much clearer, simpler recovery
procedure has been in the laws since 1927. Since that date each
Revenue Act has contained a section forbidding the courts to enjoin
'Blackwell v. Gastonia, 181 N. C. 378, 379, 109 S. E. 218 (1921) ("The
present statute is not in the same language used in 1887, but the same purpose
prevails, the same relief is afforded the taxpayers, and it would seem to be
broad and comprehensive enough to cover all taxe. . .. )
' Carstarphen v. Plymouth, 186 N. C. 90, 118 S.E. 905 (1923) (payment to
city tax collector.)
The state taxes, inheritance, estate, license, franchise, income, and sales,
are paid to the Revenue Commissioner.
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taxes imposed by that Act, followed by this procedure for payment
and recovery:
"Whenever a person shall have a valid defense to the enforcement
of the collection of a tax assessed or charged against him or his
property such person shall pay such tax to the proper officer, and
notify such officer in writing that he pays same under protest.
Such payment shall be without prejudice to any defense or rights
he may have in the premises, and he may, at any time within thirty
days after such payment, demand the same in writing from the
Commissioner of Revenue of the State, if a state tax, or if a
county, city, or town tax, from the treasurer thereof, for the
benefit or under the authority or by request of which the same was
levied; and if the same shall not be refunded within ninety days
thereafter, may sue such official for the amount so demanded; and
if upon the trial it shall be determined that such tax or any part
thereof was levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized pur-
pose, or was for any reason invalid or excessive, judgment shall
be rendered therefor, with interest, and the same shall be col-
lected as in other cases. The amount of state taxes for which
judgment shall be rendered in such action shall be refunded by
the state."59
What then becomes of Section 7979? The injunction part of the
above provision in the Revenue Act by its terms applies only to taxes
imposed in that Act. It can be argued that since county, city, and
town taxes are not imposed in the Revenue Act they are not within
the prohibition. When we come to the recovery part, however, the
statute plainly says, state, county, city and town taxes. Further-
more, local tax suits have been based on this provision.0 0 The
procedure of this new section covers everything that Section 7979
does and more, since it provides for suit against the Commissioner
of Revenue. Most of the recovery suits since 1927 have been
founded upon the Revenue Act provision, 0 though Section 7979
seems to have been used at least once.0 2 Although there is this in-
"Supra notes 9 and 10 for references to this provision in the session laws
from 1927 to 1933.
'Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Lenoir, 200 N. C. 494, 157 S. E. 610 (1931);
Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N. C. 255, 156 S. E. 857 (1931) ; Martin v. Guilford, 201
N. C. 63, 158 S. E. 847 (1931).
'Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 145, 144 N. C. 701
(1928); McFadden v. Maxwell, 198 N. C. 223, 151 S. E. 250 (1930); Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1931); supra
note 60.
'Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Brunswick, 198 N. C. 549, 152 S. E. 627
(1930) ; see Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Sanford, supra note 39 (an injunction
case, where the court directed plaintiff to §7979.)
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dication that Section 7979 still stands, the taxpayer has nothing to
lose by looking solely to the Revenue Act procedure. Because such
difference as there is between them is one more of scope than of
detail (payment, protest, demand), the decisions under the older
section should be in point for the newer provision. Before these de-
tails are considered, one should first look at the administrative rem-
edies. If administrative review is appropriate, the court will insist
upon it; and in some cases that review may be final.
II (A). ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The Board of County Commissioners in each county constitutes
a County Board of Equalization and Review. After the tax assessors
have made their reports the County Board gives notice of its ap-
proaching meeting, at which time property owners may appear and
present their claims for revision of the assessments.68 The Board
has power to increase or reduce the assessed valuation of property so
that it will be on the books at its "true value in money." Appeal may
be taken from an order of the County Board to the State Board of
Assessment, which, after a hearing, will reduce, increase, or confirm
the valuation fixed by the County Board.6 4 The statute does not
provide for appeal from the State Board to the courts. What the
taxpayer should do next is not clear from the decisions. If he ques-
tions only the result xeached by the State Board, that is, questions
its judgment as to valuation, there seems to be no recourse to the
courts.65 It is upon this valuation that the tax is to be paid, and he
may not sue to recover. The finding of the State Board, if arrived
at by correct procedure, should be final. If the Board has proceeded
upon an erroneous principle, the dissatisfied party should apply to
'N. C. Pun. LAws 1933, c. 204, §523; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie Supp.
1933) §7971 (52).
o'N. C. PuB. LAws, 1933, c. 204, §§525-526; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie Supp.
1933) §§7971 (54)-7971 (55). Care must be taken to comply with the require-
ments for notice to the County Board and to the State Board. As to the
procedure if the State Board refuses to review the County Board's action, see
Marion Mfg. Co. v. McDowell, 189 N. C. 99, 126 S. E. 114 (1925) (where
mandamus is indicated); Western Carolina Power Co. v. Burke, 201 N. C. 318,
160 S. E. 173 (1931) (pointing out certiorari as the proper step when the State
Board erroneously declines to interfere with an order of the County Board).
"No case in point under the present set-up has been found. Older cases
are: Wilmington, Columbia, etc. R. Co. v. Brunswick, 72 N. C. 10 (1875);
Wade v. Craven, 74 N. C. 81 (1876) ; Carolina Central R. Co. v. Richmond, 74
N. C. 83 (1876) ; Pickens v. Henderson, 112 N. C. 698, 17 S. E. 438 (1893).
Note statements in these cases that if the reviewing body proceeded upon
erroneous principle the court might interfere. See also, the cases in note 66,
infra.
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the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari to review the order. 6
Another function of the State Board is the assessment of the prop-
erty of public utilities and the assessment of the stock of financial
institutions. 67 No provision is found in the statutes for appeal to the
courts from these assessments, and presumably the principles stated
above should apply. Domestic corporations are assessed on their cor-
porate excess by the State Board. If dissatisfied, the corporation
may file exceptions with the Board and may have a hearing on these
points before the Board. Here the statute provides an appeal to the
Superior Court and thence to the Supreme Court.68 The foregoing
seems to be the procedure for correcting erroneous valuations of
property. The exhausting of all available administrative relief and of
review of the administrative action by the courts through appeal or
by certiorari is important. 9 It seems that at no stage in this pro-
cedure may the taxpayer pay aud sue to recover. His remedy is to
have the erroneous valuation corrected.
Consider the administrative relief for taxes other than those on
property. The Revenue Act carries an assortment of provisions for
review of state taxes. In the administration of the inheritance tax
the Commissioner of Revenue is authorized to investigate and make
an appraisal additional to that returned by the executor or admin-
istrator. If the executor or administrator is not satisfied with the
additional appraisal, he may appeal to the Commissioner, will be given
a hearing, and may then appeal to the Superior Court of the county
in which the estate is situated.70 Here, however, the tax must be
paid or a bond double the additional tax must be filed before appeal
to the Court.
Franchise taxes of domestic and foreign corporations are based
on their outstanding capital stock, surplus and undivided profits, the
administrative determination of which is the work of the Revenue
I On petitioning for a writ of certiorari, see: Caldwell County v. Doughton,
195 N. C. 62, 141 S. E. 289 (1928); Western Carolina Power Co. v. Burke,
supra note 64; Hooker v. Pitt, supra note 16.
IN. C. PuB. LAWS, 1933, c. 204, §§700-721, §§600-602; N. C. CoDS ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1933) §§7971 (64)-7971 (86), §§7971 (59)-7971 (61).
1 N. C. PUB. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §603; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §7971 (62). See Garysburg Mfg. Co. v. Pender, 196 N. C. 744, 147 S. E.
284 (1929).
' Covington v. Rockingham, supra note 32; Wilson v. Green, 135 N. C. 343,
47 S. E .469 (1904); Marion Mfg. Co. v. McDowell, supra note 64; Hart v.
Burke, supra note 32; Garysburg Mfg. Co. v. Pender, supra note 68; Western
Carolina Power Co. v. Burke, mpra note 64; Hooker v. Pitt, supra note 16.
" N. C. PUB. LAWS 1933, c. 445, §22; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1933)
§7880 (24).
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Commissioner.7 ' He notifies the corporation of the amount fixed as
a basis for the tax, and the corporation may appeal to the Commis-
sioner for a review and reassessment. The Commissioner hears evi-
dence and makes his findings.7 2 Nothing is said in the statute on
the procedure from this point.73
Two other cases of administrative review are those in which the
Commissioner, upon examination of the tax returns, proposes to
assess the taxpayer an additional franchise tax or an additional in-
come tax. The taxpayer may request a hearing before the Commis-
sioner, after which the Commissioner renders his decision.7 4 Again
the statute is silent about court review. Prior io 1933 the taxpayer
could file exceptions to the findings of the Commissioner regarding
his taxable income. The Commissioner would pass upon the ex-
ceptions, and the taxpayer could appeal to the Superior Court of
Wake County, and from there to the Supreme Court.7 5 Here also
the tax had to be paid prior to the appeal. The section giving this
appeal was dropped from the 1933 Revenue Act.
Finally, there is the sales tax with its own method of review.
The merchant makes his return; it is corrected by the Commissioner;
and, if the merchant is aggrieved, he may petition for a hearing,
setting out his reasons for the hearing and the amount in which the
tax should be reduced. The Commissioner may grant or deny the
hearing. If granted, after the hearing the Commissioner makes such
order as appears to him "just and lawful." The sales tax then has
its own section for suit to recover taxes, omitting the requirements
of protest and demand contained in the more comprehensive recovery
section, and conferring original jurisdiction in such actions upon the
U N. C. Pun. LAws 1933, c. 445, §§210-211; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §§7880 (118)-7880 (119).
"N. C. PuR. LAws, 1933, c. 445, §212; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie Supp.
1933) §7880 (120).
"There does not appear to be any statutory method of administrative re-
view of public utility franchise taxes, or of state, county, or city license taxes.
"'N. C. Pu. LAWS 1933, c. 445, §§216, 335; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
Supp. 1933) §7880 (123y2), §7880 (153). These sections require that the tax-
payer apply for the hearing within thirty days from notice of the proposed
assessment. Another section (340 in the PuB. LAws, or 7880 (155) in Michie)
in the income tax part of the Revenue Act permits application for revision
within three years from the filing of the return or from date of notice of the
assessment of any additional tax.
"N. C. Pun. LAws 1931, c. 427, §341; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§7880 (156); Maxwell v. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc., 199 N. C. 42, 153 S. E. 850
(1930) ; Maxwell v. Chemical Construction Co., 200 N. C. 500, 157 N. C. 606
(1931).
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Superior Court of the county in which the taxpayer resides.7 6 In
the absence of judicial interpretation of this setion, it would seem
a wise precaution to comply in the matter of protest and demand.
Thus it is seen that in some cases appeal to the courts from the
Commissioner's fact determination is provided; in others the statutes
are silent. Although both concern findings on values or amounts,
there should be a distinction between the finality of the State Board
of Assessment's valuation, which represents the judgment of an ap-
pellate agency, and the findings of the Commissioner. Such dis-
tinction should result in judicial review of the Commissioner's find-
ings, while review of the values determined by the State Board may
not be available. This uncertainty of the procedure results from a
failure to discover a case of judicial review of the Commissioner's
determination of value or amount. There have been numerous cases
of payments under protest and suits to recover taxes administered
by the Commissioner, but the disputes have related to interpretation
of statutes, constitutionality of rate, constitutionality of classifica-
tion, and the like.77 It does seem that the taxpayer who disputes the
Commissioner's findings on the base of his tax should be able to have
the finding reviewed, and payment under protest and suit to recover
appears the most appropriate method, outside of a statutory pro-
vision for appeal.
This much is clear: the taxpayer should be exceedingly careful to
take advantage of all available administrative review, paying atten-
tion to time and notice requirements of the statutes. If dissatisfied,
he should take the administrative order to the courts, by appeal where
the statute gives it, or he should petition for a writ of certiorari if
the dispute is jurisdictional or if the administrative agency has fol-
" N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 445, §417; N. C. CoD ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1933) §7880 (156).
'The recovery suits against the Commissioner in the last ten years involved
these questions: constitutionality of classification, Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.
v. Doughton, supra note 61; Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C. 604, 150 S. E. 190
(1929); Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, mspra note 61; Southern
Grain Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 661, 155 S. E. 557 (1930) ; interpretation of
statute, Boon-Isely Drug Co. v. Doughton, 189 N. C. 720, 128 S. E. 341 (1925) ;
Hagood v. Doughton, 195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928) ; Mavis Bottling Co.
v. Doughton, 196 N. C. 791, 147 S. E. 289 (1929); Lillington Stone Co. v.
Maxwell, 203 N. C. 151, 165 S. E. 351 (1932) ; jurisdiction to tax, Rhode Island
Trust Co. v. Doughton, 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924) ; interpretation of
trust agreement, State and City Bank v. Doughton, 188 N. C. 762, 125 S. E.
621 (1924); exemption, Waddell v. Doughton, 194 N. C. 537, 140 S. E. 160
(1927) ; constitutionality of tax rate, Railway Express Agency v. Maxwell, 199
N. C. 637, 155 S. E. 553 (1930).
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lowed an irregular procedure. Where the dispute is not over the
amount of the assessment, but it is nearer to the cases concerning
so-called illegality (for example, whether or not a taxpayer comes
within the terms of a statute) he may pay the tax and sue to recover;
and where the tax is well within an illegal class, it may be enjoined,
that is, if any tax may now be enjoined in the state courts.
II(B). JuilCiAL PRocEnmu
If the tax is to be paid and recovered, the statutory procedure
must be followed strictly. The recovery statute may be separated
into these essential mandates: (1) Have a "valid defense" to the
enforcement of the tax. (2) Pay the tax to the proper officer, and
notify the officer in writing that the tax is paid under protest.
(3) Within thirty days after payment, demand refund of the tax
from the Revenue Commissioner, if a state tax, or from the treas-
urer of the town, city or county, depending on which unit levied the
tax. (4) If not refunded within ninety days from the demand, then
sue the Revenue Commissioner or the county, city, or town treas-
urer for fhe amount demanded. (5) If the trial determines that any
part of the tax was "levied or assessed for an illegal or unauthorized
purpose or was for any reason invalid or excessive" judgment shall
be rendered for such part with interest.
Of course the meaning of "valid defense" must be looked for in
the decisions. Some help in interpretation is found in the termi-
nology of part (5) above. In connection with injunctions something
was seen of the vague and unsatisfactory distinctions, made con-
cerning "illegal, unauthorized and invalid." They are defects of a
jurisdictional, constitutional nature, usually substantive rather than
procedural, and applied in disputes over whether any tax at all is
due and not when the question is how much is due. The new word
in the present statute is "excessive." This is said to mean a tax
exceeding what the tax would be if calculated upon the valuation
finally fixed by the proper authorities, 78 and presumably a tax in
excess of that set out in the statute. There is another case in which
suit to recover is held appropriate, although said to be not within the
illegal, invalid, unauthorized class, and clearly it cannot be called an
excessive tax. It is where the taxpayer denies that he comes within
a tax classification. As previously indicated, that dispute seems akin
" Pickens v. Henderson, supra note 65; Pocomoke Guano Co. v. New Bern,
172 N. C. 258, 90 S. E. 202 (1916) ; see Marion Mfg. Co. v. McDowell, supra
note 64.
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to the question of whether a particular subject is exempt, yet the
court has said the correct procedure is recovery and that an injunc-
tion may not be had.7 9 The only limitation on what can be tested by
payment and recovery appears to be a dispute that relates not to
"legality" but to value or amount; there the administrative route
must be followed, at least before going to court.
Having decided that the tax is one which he might expect to re-
cover after payment and suit, the taxpayer makes his payment to the
Revenue Commissioner or to the town, city or county tax collector.
In the absence of a statute intended to facilitate payment under pro-
test as a method of contesting taxes, the payment must be made under
compulsion, which generally means payment to free plaintiff's prop-
erty or person from legal restraint.80 Under the statute a payment
accompanied by protest in writing is sufficient. It is essential, how-
ever, that a written notice to the collector that the tax is paid under
protest accompany the payment; otherwise it is considered voluntary
and recovery is barred.81 No special form of statement seems to be
required.
Then within thirty days after the payment and protest the tax-
payer must make a written demand on the Revenue Commissioner,
if a state tax, or on the treasurer of the town, or city, or county, if
a local tax, that the payment be refunded. Here it should be noted
that the demand for the local tax is made on the treasurer, and not
on the tax collector.8 2 Although the statute says the taxpayer "may"
make the demand within thirty days, the court has said this is
mandatory.83
If the tax is not refunded within ninety days after the demand,
the taxpayer may sue the official from whom it was demanded. The
recovery statute does not say within what period the suit must be
brought. However, Section 441 of Michie's North Carolina Code of
1931 specifies a three year limitation for actions "Upon a liability
"Ragan v. Doughton, 192 N. C. 500, 135 S. E. 328 (1926) (plaintiff sought
to restrain collection of a license tax, alleging that he was not engaged in the
business of buying and selling real estate for profit, for which he had been
taxed).
'Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, supra note 51; North Carolina R. Co. v.
Alamance, supra note 42.
8Blackwell v. Gastonia, 181 N. C. 378, 107 S. E. 218 (1921); Hunt v.
Cooper, 194 N. C. 265, 139 S. E. 446 (1927); Maxwell v. Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc., supra note 75.
'See, Hunt v. Cooper, supra, note 81; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Bruns-
wick, supra note 62.
'Richmond and Danville R. Co. v. Reidsville, 109 N. C. 494, 13 S. E. 865
(1891) ; Hatwood v. Fayetteville, 121 N. C. 207, 28 S. E. 299 (1897) ; Bristol v.
Morganton, 125 N. C. 365, 34 S. E. 512 (1899) ; Teeter v. Wallace, 138 N. C.
264, 50 S. E. 701 (1905) ; Blackwell v. Gastonia, supra note 81.
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created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, unless some
other time is mentioned in the statutes creating it." This should be
applicable to tax recovery actions.84 Whether the suit is to be brought
originally in a court of a justice of the peace, or in some other in-
ferior court, or whether it is to be brought originally in the Superior
Court depends upon the amount of the tax sought to be recovered.8 5
If the action is against the Revenue Commissioner, it should be
brought in Wake County.88
Although interest is to be included in the recovery, the statute
does not specify the rate or the time from which it is computed.
Without such stipulation it is likely that the "legal rate," six per
cent per annum, applies,87 and is to be computed from the date of
payment of the tax.88
The complaint should fully set forth the facts showing the illegal-
ity of the tax and the amount of illegal tax collected. It should be
alleged, that plaintiff paid the tax on a certain date and to a certain
official, either the Revenue Commissioner or to the county or city
collecting officer and that a protest in writing accompanied the pay-
ment; that within thirty days from the date plaintiff made a written
demand on the Revenue Commissioner or on the county or city treas-
urer, as the case may be, notifying him that if the tax was not re-
funded in ninety days an action would be brought for its recovery;
and that the tax has not been refunded.89
"Hatwood v. Fayetteville,. supra note 83; Cf. Field, The Recovery of Illegal
and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 501, 519.
' If the amount exclusive of interest does not exceed two hundred dollars
the action must be brought in a court of a justice of the peace, or in a re-
corder's court having civil jurisdiction, or in a county court. If more than
two hundred dollars the action must be brought in the Superior Court, or in a
county court, or (where the amount exclusive of interest does not exceed one
thousand dollars) in a recorder's court having civil jurisdiction. N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie 1931) §1436, §1473, §§1589-1590, §1608 (n) ; see Murdock v.
Commissioners,- 138 N. C. 124, 50 S. E. 567 (1905); Blackwell v. Gastonia,
supra note 81; Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N. C. 604, 150 S. E. 190 (1929) ; Martin
v. Guilford, supra note 60.
" When brought in the Superior Court of a county other than Wake County,
the Commissioner may have the action removed to the Superior Court of
Wake County. McFadden v. Maxwell, 198 N. C. 223, 151 S. E. 250 (1930).
As to removal on appeal from a justice of the peace, see MCINTOSH, N. C.
PRAC. AND PROC. (1929) 266-267.
"N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie 1931) §2305. Where the tax is refunded merely
upon notice and demand, without suit, interest is not paid. Cannon v. Maxwell,
205 N. C. 420 (1933).
'See Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Nash, 196 N. C. 704, 146 S. E. 861
(1929); Kohn v. Elizabeth City, 199 N. C. 529, 155 S. E. 152 (1930); Car-
starphen v. Plymouth, supra note 57; cf. Southern R. Co. v. Cherokee, 194
N. C. 781, 140 S. E. 748 (1927).
"Pocomoke Guano Co. v. New Bern, supra note 78; Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Brunswick, 178 N. C. 254, 100 S. E. 428 (1919) ; Hunt v. Cooper, supra
note 81.
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Suppose the taxpayer has failed to make the protest or demanc
in the prescribed manner, is he barred from any recovery action?
The North Carolina Supreme Court has said that the statutory
remedy is exclusive.90 However, the United States Supreme Court
has held that if a tax which is invalid under the Federal Constitution
is paid under compulsion (and not simply under protest), the tax-
payer may sue the collector, without regard to the statute-this on the
theory that to forbid an action to recover such a payment is to deny
due process of law.91 Here the taxpayer would be enforcing his com-
mon law right against the collector. When the collection of the tax
violates only the State Constitution the state should be able to require
compliance with the recovery statute. whether or not the payment
was compulsory.
III. RELIEF IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The taxpayer may sue in the federal District Court to enforce
the right of action given by the recovery statute, if the elements of
federal jurisdiction (federal question or diversity of citizenship, and
requisite amount in controversy) are present.92 Although a suit
against the Revenue Commissioner may be considered a suit against
the state, from which the state is immune, the statute authorizing the
action and in no way restricting it to the state courts, should be con-
sidered a waiver of immunity for actions in the federal courts as well
as in the state courts. 93 Suits against county or city treasurers are
not concerned in this question.
To rely upon the statute, the taxpayer must of course comply
with it. If he has not followed the statute and the payment was
"Richmond and Danville R. Co. v. Reidsville; Teeter v. Wallace; Black-
well v. Gastonia, all supra note 83.
"Ward v. Love, 253 U. S. 17, 40 Sup. Ct. 419, 64 L. ed. 751 (1920) ; Car-
penter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 50 Sup. Ct. 121, 74 L. ed. 478 (1930); see
Security Nat. Bank v. Young, 55 F (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); see Field,
supra note 84, at 521.
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481, 33 Sup. Ct. 942,
57 L. ed. 1288 (1913) ; Chicago, B. and 0. R. R. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44
Sup. Ct. 431, 68 L. ed. 878 (1924) ; Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford, 281 U. S.
121, 50 Sup. Ct. 270, 74 L. ed. 737 (1930) ; Wilmington v. Ricaud, 90 F (2d>
214 (C. C. A. 4th, 1898).
" Where the waiver was limited to actions in the state courts, Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 20 Sup. Ct. 919, 44 L. ed. 1140 (1900) ; Chandler v. Dix,
194 U. S. 590, 24 Sup. Ct. 766, 48 L. ed. 1129 (1904); Southern R. Co. v.
Query, 21 F (2d) 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927) ; see United States v. Cordy, 58 F.
(2d) 1013 (D. Md. 1932) ; Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C.
1931) (where in an injunction proceeding against a state officer it was said that
the remedy by payment and suit was available in the federal courts).
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compulsory, he may find some relief in his common law right as
indicated above.
The prohibition of injunctions carried in the Revenue Act has no
effect on equitable relief in the federal courts.94 Whether the tax-
payer may invoke the aid of equity depends on whether the remedy
at law is adequate.95 And this adequate legal remedy must be one
available in the federal court.96 Three cases which have arisen in
the federal courts in North Carolina are helpful delineators of equity
jurisdiction. The Henrietta Mills sought to enjoin Rutherford
County and its sheriff from collecting a tax based on an alleged in-
tentionally discriminatory assessment. The District Court found
there was no unlawful discrimination and also was of the opinion
that there was an adequate remedy at law by payment and recovery.
Its dismissal of the bill was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
which in turn was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
9 7
The theory was this: a federal court of equity will not restrain the
collection of an illegal tax if the taxpayer has a "plain, adequate, and
complete" remedy at law available in the federal court; the North
Carolina recovery statute supplies this remedy; such authorization of
injunctions as is found in the North Carolina statutes provides a
remedy but does not create a substantive right which would be en-
forced in the federal courts. In a second case, the Garysburg Man-
ufacturing Company contended that the State Board of Assessment
had included in its computation of complainant's corporate excess
certain property which was not taxable in North Carolina. The Dis-
trict Court enjoined collection, but the Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed this, holding that the North Carolina statute relating to this
assessment enabled the taxpayer to file exceptions and have a hear-
ing before the State Board, and if the exceptions were overruled, the
corporation was allowed an appeal to the Superior Court and then to
the Supreme Court; and as the taxpayer had not taken advantage of
this remedy provided by statute he could not ask a federal court to
enjoin the tax.93  Another case, Gramling v. Maxwell,99 was an
"Ex parte Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 13 Sup. Ct. 785, 37 L. ed. 689 (1893).
Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island, etc. R. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 46 Sup. Ct. 236,
70 L. ed. 641 (1926); see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Doughton, 262 U. S.
413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620, 67 L. ed. 1051 (1923).
Southern I Co. v. Query, 21 F (2d) 333 (E. D. S. C. 1927).
"T Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford, supra note 92; reported below, 32 F (2d)
570 (C. C. A 4th, 1929) ; 26 F. (2d) 799 (W. D. N. C. 1928) ; noted (1929)
8 N. C. L. REv. 62. Cf. Southern R. Co. v. Asheville, 69 F 359 (W. D. N. C.
1885).
" Pender County v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 50 F (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931);
reported'below, 42 F (2d) 500 (E. D. N. C. 1930).
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application for an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement
of a palpably unconstitutional state license tax brought before a
specially constituted three-judge court. The suit was instituted in be-
half of a large number of peddlers, over one hundred of whom were
alleged to have contributed to the expense of the litigation. Here
the remedy at law by payment and suit to. recover was held to be
inadequate because of the multiple suits necessitated. Other factors
influencing the decision to enjoin the tax were, the flagrant illegality
of the tax and the burden which its payment would impose upon this
class of taxpayers. Collection of the tax was enjoined and no appeal
was taken.
From these cases it can be deduced, that the federal courts are
ready to enjoin a tax when it is manifestly illegal and its collection
would work particular hardship; that illegality of a tax alone will
not secure an injunction; that the North Carolina remedy by pay-
ment and recovery normally is adequate; that administrative or
statutory remedies must be followed before the taxpayer goes to the
federal courts. In short, a federal court will not enjoin a tax when
there is an adequate remedy at law, and the North Carolina admin-
istrative and tax recovery remedies are adequate in most situations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The most disturbing aspect of the procedure for tax relief relates
to administrative remedies. Fragmentary statutes, and judicial opin-
ions too properly restricted to the point decided make the taxpayer
experiment in a field where it would be for the best interest of the
government and the taxpayer if the procedure were well defined.
Once it is established that a particular tax may be enjoined or that it
may be paid and recovered, the procedure is reasonably clear. But
before that the taxpayer must decide at his peril what administrative
aid he must seek and then whether he can go to court, and if so, how.
The statutes providing for each form of tax could set out fully the
method of contesting that tax and state in what cases the legislature
intended the question to be reviewed by the courts, and the method
of bringing the question to the court.100
-52 F (2d) 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931) ; commented upon, (1932) 30 Mxcn. L.
R . 624 (1931); 10 N. C. L. REv. 99. Cf. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S.
521, 52 Sup. Ct. 217, 76 L. ed. 447 (1932).
" That was done for the income tax in the Revenue Acts from 1925 until
1931. N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie 1931) §7880 (156). Unfortunately, this pro-
vision was not included in the 1933 Act.
